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One solution would be to allow prior appropriation to remain as the underlying doctrine, while using statutes to strictly limit the beneficial uses allowed by the doctrine. Currently, beneficial use "is a fairly elastic concept that freezes old customs, allows users flexibility in the amount and method of use, and leaves line drawing to the courts."
Link the quotation to the source, please.
Some legislatures have enumerated the uses that qualify as beneficial, but their definitions are very expansive and even include snowmaking and dust control. If a more restrictive definition were adopted that terminated the rights of certain appropriators, it could free up water for more essential uses.
Another development frequently cited as evidence that prior appropriation will meet future needs is the emergence of water markets. Advocates claim that the alienability of water under prior appropriation allows owners to sell to the most efficient user. Making the Coasian argument that initial entitlements are not determinative of an efficient outcome, however, assumes that water is merely another form of property to be exploited. Marketplaces may indeed be an effective means of granting lucrative water rights to the party most willing to pay for them, but do not assure that the most crucial needs are met. Additionally, because “water is an ambient resource where the actions of any one user necessarily affect many other users,” creating efficient water markets would require overcoming the extremely high transaction costs associated with disaggregated ownership.
A few states have begun to purchase water rights from private holders and then lease the rights back to the original owners. This policy creates state control without changing water usage in the short term, and is a step in the right direction that should be emulated by the other western states. By centralizing ownership within state governments, the region would have an opportunity to create a long term plan that is responsive to current water needs, but balances future requirements against expected decreases in supply. Instead of allowing unpredictable market forces to determine the allocation of the resource, water managers could ensure that it serves the immediate needs of the population and of necessary industry. To effectuate such a policy, states could rely upon takings to secure water rights from unwilling owners.
It's always nice to see someone advocating socialism, but wouldn't it be reasonable to expect you to be candid about it? Something wrong with the word?
Finally, states could use the public trust doctrine to inhibit users from drawing excessive amounts of water from certain sources. The public trust has been criticized because courts have failed to provide sufficient justification for applying it (cite-paper 15) , but the expected decrease of water could provide such a justification. While this could be an effective strategy for limiting use in specific cases, it requires extensive litigation on a case by case basis, and would not be an adequate policy by itself.
So we've gone from an argument about technical law, in your earlier drafts, where doctrine appeared important and the political issues were at least partially obscured, to a new form of argument, in which doctrine is essentially secondary, and what's central is the political debate between socialism and private property, in which—without being willing to come out and say so—you are entirely on the socialist side. So the really interesting question is, what happened between the drafts? Was it the effect of Tarlock and others, showing you that doctrine's not as straightforward as it looks; a desire to demonstrate that you can make socialist arguments because you think I'll like them; an actual political conviction emerging once the underlying matter of securing the people's welfare is no longer diffused by legal mumbo-jumbo; etc.? The most interesting next step is to inquire into what your revision means.