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< < | Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones in the 21st Century
Are you saying that
you're not trying to write about the state of the law 88 years from
now, in the 22nd century? Or distinguishing the situation from the
20th century, when there were no smartphones anyway? How about just
"Warrantless Searches of Smartphones"? | > > | Warrantless Searches of Smart Phones | | -- By SpencerWan - 22 Oct 2011 | |
< < | With new technology being innovated and used in everyday society,
Is there a society we
don't use everyday? Is technology innovated?
laws have been more and more increasingly insufficient to protect citizens from violations of their rights.
What is the difference
between "more and more increasingly" and "increasingly"? This
sentence appears to mean "Technological change has outstripped the
law's ability to protect citizens' rights." You have used 26 words
where 11 would do. That means this draft hasn't been edited by you
at all.
One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smart phone. I am using the term "smart phone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smart phone is confiscated. Under the current law that has not adjusted to the reality of a mobile phone being more than just a telephonic device, the police can now search the phone and its digital content. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. The law must adapt to prevent abuse of this new 21st century reality.
Courts have made exceptions for warrantless searches in two situations: exigent circumstances and searches incident to arrest. The rule for exigent circumstances has been set forth by the Supreme Court as such: “[w]here there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Exigent circumstances can always exist, and courts may use the exception on a case-by-case analysis.
The more interesting discussion lies with the [[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_incident_to_arrest][search
incident to arrest doctrine]], and whether it applies to warrantless searches of data within a smart phone.
Under the search incident to arrest
doctrine, the police can search the person and his immediate
“grabbing space” to protect against physical danger and to
prevent the destruction of evidence. Most courts have used the
doctrine to uphold warrantless searches of cell phone content. The
court in United States v. Finley
decided not to recognize the
distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a
physical container of evidence. Police had arrested Finley as part of a staged drug bust, and seized his phone during the arrest. When Finley was being questioned, the police looked through his phone and found incriminating text messages and call logs. The court did not recognize a distinction between a cell phone and a closed container, and therefore held that such searches of closed containers fall within the search incident to arrest exception. Since the phone was taken during a proper custodial arrest, the search of the phone was constitutionally valid. More recently, the court in People v. Diaz held that a cell phone seized during an arrest is an object immediately associated with a person, and thus it can be searched incident to arrest. The court determined that the key question was how to characterize the phone. Whether the phone is immediately associated with his person is crucial because “[i]f it was, then the delayed warrantless search was a valid search incident to defendant's lawful custodial arrest. If it was not, then the search, because it was remote in time and place from the arrest, cannot be justified as incident to that arrest unless an exigency existed.” As these cases illustrate, at least some courts have been willing to allow warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest. | > > | Technological change has outstripped the current law's ability to protect citizens' rights. One important issue that remains unresolved by courts is whether law enforcement can search through the digital content of a smartphone. I am using the term "smartphone" to mean a cell phone that has increased technological capabilities such as email, software applications, and internet access. Imagine a situation where a man is arrested and his smartphone is confiscated. Under the existing law, the police can now search the phone and its digital content without a warrant. This can potentially include text messages, emails, bank account numbers and passwords, photos of loved ones, correspondence with lawyers or doctors, and contact information of family and friends. The amount of information we hold fundamentally private can now be found on a device that fits in our pocket. Technology has now put more private information on an individual than ever before. | | | |
< < | However, when the object being searched is now
technologically advanced to resemble a computer more than just a cell
phone with call records and text messages, the analysis should change. | > > | An exception for a warrantless search is a search incident to arrest. Searches incident to arrest, however, are reasonable only for the purposes of removing dangerous items that threaten the arresting officer or preserving evidence. The Supreme Court has laid out the exception as applied to containers found on an individual in United States v. Robinson and United States v. Chadwick. In Robinson, the Court upheld a search of a cigarette packet found in the shirt pocket of an arrestee, saying that searches of containers at the time of arrest is valid. Later, the Chadwick Court narrows the container doctrine when it held that a locked footlocker found with the arrestee could not be searched without a warrant. The Court reasoned that the footlocker had a higher expectation of privacy and once the footlocker was in police control, there was no danger of officer harm or loss of evidence. | | | |
> > | The court in United States v. Finley
decided not to recognize the distinction between a cell phone carrying digital content and a
physical container of evidence. Police had arrested Finley as part of a staged drug bust, and seized his phone during the arrest. When Finley was being questioned, the police looked through his phone and found incriminating evidence. The court did not recognize a distinction between a cell phone and a closed container, and therefore held that such searches of closed containers fall within the search incident to arrest exception. More recently, the court in People v. Diaz held that a cell phone seized during an arrest is an object immediately associated with a person, and thus it can be searched incident to arrest. | | | |
< < | Searching the contents of a computer incident to arrest has been ruled unlawful in the only appellate court the issue has been argued. The court in State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), ruled that the seizure of a laptop was lawful, but the search of its contents was unconstitutional. Since the court applied the search incident to arrest doctrine and held that the search did not fall under the exception, it can be deduced that the contents of a laptop cannot be searched under the incident to arrest exception. Furthermore, in United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007), the court upheld a warrantless search of text messages on a cell phone taken incident to arrest, but added that "[i]f the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court's reaction may be different, because of the substantial invasion of privacy." | > > | Modern smartphones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities. However, there exists a disparate treatment of the two because courts haven't recognized the distinction between smartphones and simple cell phones. Warrantless searches of cell phones have been for the most part upheld. Cases involving warrantless searches of computers are rare, and the few cases that do speak on the issue seem to suggest that searches of computers without warrants would not fall under the incident to arrest exception. | | | |
< < | Modern-day smart phones are essentially small computers with phone capabilities as well, however, there exists a disparate treatment of the two in the law. Warrantless searches of cell phones have been for the most part upheld. Cases involving warrantless searches of computers are uncommon, possibly due to law enforcement thinking it is beyond their rights to search a computer. The few cases that do speak on the issue seem to suggest that searches of computers without warrants should not and would not fall under the incident to arrest exception. | > > | The court in State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 WL 104492 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002), ruled that the search of a laptop contents found in the backpack of the arrestee was unconstitutional. Furthermore, in United States v. Urbina, No. 06-CR-336, 2007 WL 4895782, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 6, 2007), the court upheld a warrantless search of text messages on a cell phone taken incident to arrest, but added that "[i]f the evidence in a future case were to show that the warrantless search conducted by law enforcement was essentially equivalent to a search of a personal computer, without sufficient exigencies to justify such a search, the court's reaction may be different, because of the substantial invasion of privacy." The heightened expectation of privacy on a computer and smartphone garners a heightened privacy protection. When the exception was crafted, it made sense to temper the Fourth Amendment protection during arrests because it was a reasonable search. The smartphone breaks down that reasoning because unfettered access to a smartphone is access to essentially everything private in a person's life. | | After the aforementioned Diaz case was decided, California legislature unanimously passed a bill that would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before searching the contents of a cell phone taken from a person under arrest. The bill would have effectively overruled the Diaz decision, and declare that searches of cell phones do not fall within the search incident to arrest exception. http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/20/tech/mobile/california-phone-search-law/ | |
< < | Unfortunately, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill saying, "The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ The validity of his statement can be debated, but what can't be debated is the result that the veto leaves us: in California, police can search cell phones taken from an arrestee without a warrant. | > > | Unfortunately, Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill saying, "The courts are better suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.” http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/ Courts have always been a step behind technology. Legislature hasn't always gotten it correct either as seen in spectrum allocation when radio was invented and television emerged. However, the bill in this case was correct to protect the privacy rights of individuals. Jerry Brown seems to have been swayed by the generous donors to his election campaign, supporters who will be crucial for his re-election. The Diaz court gave him an out, and he gladly took it, along with the privacy rights of his citizens. | | | |
< < | There are many dangers of treating smart phones like old-generation "dumb phones" as current jurisprudence has seemingly failed to prevent. Police now have access to every bit of information about a person at the time of arrest. Loss of privacy can now occur with mere probable cause. This outcome is incongruent with our fundamental values of privacy and needs to be prevented as the number of smart phone users rapidly increase. | | | |
< < | Because it has not been
edited, this draft is blowsy. It says half as much as can be put in
the space. It interferes with its own progress the way you would be
hampered if you filled your apartment with junk until you could
barely walk the halls. Analytically, you never explain why the
category "computer" is more important than the category "stuff you
had in your pockets when you were arrested." You do not review the
law of search incident to arrest very comprehensively, citing a
single "closed-container" case as though that were the only point in
the space, and as though a box and a briefcase are always the same,
and printed papers are always the same as white powders. Your
discussion of the California situation is limited in the end to the
use of an editorial adverb. Whether Brown's veto is "fortunate" or
"unfortunate" is probably less important than the stated rationale
you punt on discussing, or the political and industrial context you
could have summoned to enlighten the reader as to other reasons why
he cast it.
I don't want to perform the first edit here. That prevents you from
learning how to do it. Cut the existing material by 50% and put the
analysis in that the junk currently forces you to leave out. The
we'll be cooking with gas.
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