Law in the Internet Society

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ClementLegrandSecondEssay 17 - 22 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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Introduction

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In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" (when using the word "terrorism" I refer to its American legal definition). I will then analyze the US legal framework and discuss the proportionnality of the massive surveillance.
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In this paper, I will analyze the use of big data surveillance as it was carried out by the NSA. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" (when using the word "terrorism" I refer to its American legal definition). I will then analyze the US legal framework and discuss the proportionnality of the massive surveillance.
 

Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

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Tere are many definitions of "[Big Data". The three elements that are classically associated with Big data are the three "V"s, namely, Volume, Velocity and Variety. This means that Big Data involves the processing of an important amount of data (volume), that such data includes different kind of data (vareity) and that big data is characterized by the rapidity of the processing (velocity). Through using Big Data, it is possible to determine patterns of conducts and to make predictive deductions due to the correlation of these patterns. In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. The Snowden revelation showed that the NSA is collecting huge amount of data and that it monitors online communication through the collaboration with private companies. In the recent years, we have seen examples of how Big data has been used by intelligence services in suspected terrorism case. If this paper will focus on the collection of information by the NSA, it is worth noting that this use of Big Data is not limited to the American intelligence services.
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Tere are many definitions of "Big Data". The three elements that are classically associated with Big data are the three "V"s, namely, Volume, Velocity and Variety. This means that Big Data involves the processing of an important amount of data (volume), that such data includes different kind of data (variety) and that big data is characterized by the rapidity of the processing (velocity). Through using Big Data, it is possible to determine patterns of conducts and to make predictive deductions due to the correlation of these patterns. In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. The Snowden revelation showed that the NSA is collecting huge amount of data and that it monitors online communication through the collaboration with private companies. In the recent years, we have seen examples of how Big data has been used by intelligence services in suspected terrorism case. If this paper will focus on the collection of information by the NSA, it is worth noting that this use of Big Data is not limited to the American intelligence services.
 
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Analysis of the US legal framework

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Snowden Revelations: Brief Analysis of the US Legal Framework

 
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Under the actual legal situation, there are very few situations in which the fourth amendement will apply to the situaiton described above. In the online world, the presence of intermediaries to provide the communication triggers the application of the third party doctrine,(resulting from the famouse case Smith V. Maryland), thereby excluding expectations of privacy on most of the online information. In my opinion, this doctrine should be modified to better fit the reality of today's society: just because and information is shared with an intermediary to transfer information to a third party does not mean that the communicants have no expectations of privacy with regard to this information.
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Under the current legal situation, there are very few situations in which the fourth amendment will apply to the situation described above. In the online world, the presence of intermediaries to provide the communication triggers the application of the third party doctrine,(resulting from the famous case Smith V. Maryland), thereby excluding expectations of privacy on most of the online information. In my opinion, this doctrine should be modified to better fit the reality of today's society: just because and information is shared with an intermediary in order to transfer such information to a third party recipient does not mean that the communicants have no expectations of privacy about this information.
 
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Part of the collection of data under the PRISM program was subject to the section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act. To summarize, this section of the act intends to facilitate the surveillance of non-US citizens reasonnably believed to be located outside of the United States. THis provision does not allow to "intentionally" target US persons or Non-US persons known to be located in the United States. This provision is the legal basis for the PRISM program. A FISA court decided that the NSA could use information relating to US persons that were "inadvertently" collected. In an interview conducted by John Oliver (and mixing journalism with comedy, in order to raise awareness of the public), Edward Snowden mentioned that, in practice, this meant that if information relating to US persons were temporarily stored as a back up in Europe, the information will be processed by the NSA. This raises questions. How can the law create a distinction based on categories of persons (i.e. more or less corresponding to US citizens) when the functioning of the internet is so international? I wonder to which extent it is technically possible to distinguish communication on the basis of their sender/reciever. THe protection of privacy requires ecological measures, because privacy is an environment that we all share. On this assumption it seems complicated to distinguish which kind of person has a right to breath a better air than another.
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Part of the collection of data under the PRISM program was subject to the section 702 of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008. To summarize, this section of the act intends to facilitate the surveillance of non-US citizens reasonably believed to be located outside of the United States. This provision does not allow to "intentionally" target US persons or Non-US persons known to be located in the United States. This provision is the legal basis for the PRISM program. A FISA court decided that the NSA could use information relating to US persons that were "inadvertently" collected. In an interview conducted by John Oliver (mixing journalism with comedy, in order to raise awareness of the public), Edward Snowden mentioned that, in practice, this meant that if information relating to US persons were temporarily stored as a backup in Europe or if the communication merely transited by a server outside of the US borders, the information will be processed by the NSA. This raises questions. How can a distinction based on categories of persons (i.e. more or less corresponding to US citizens) be effective when the functioning of the internet is so international? I wonder to which extent it is technically possible to distinguish communication on the basis of the nationality of their sender/receiver. The protection of privacy requires ecological measures, because privacy is an environment that we all share. On this assumption, it seems complicated to distinguish which kind of person has a right to breath a better air than another.
 
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The collection of domestic metadata relating to ponecalls were also conducted by the NSA pursuant to section 215 of the USA PAtriot Act. It is interesting to note that the data collected consisted in metadata. According to a long established idea, metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy thant content. However, as I have shown abouve, throught he use of Big Data it is posible to deduct a series of correlations, which can result in discovering the content. This idea that metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy does not entirely correspond to today's technologies.
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The collection of domestic metadata relating to phone calls were also conducted by the NSA pursuant to section 215 of the USA Patriot Act. It is interesting to note that the data collected consisted in metadata. According to a long-established idea, metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy than content. However, as I have shown above, big data makes it possible to deduct a series of correlations, which can result in discovering the content. This idea that metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy does not entirely correspond to today's technologies. Since June 2015, the USA Freedom Act has amended the section 215 and each collection of metadata within the USA now needs a specific request to the telecommunications operators.
 
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Mass surveillance : proportionality?

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Conclusion: Legality and Proportionality

 
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The above shows that the regulatory framework of surveillance should stop or should be reformed. In my opinion the costs to human privacy are too high compared to the advantages. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security.Even though there are counterexamples where the authorities succeeded to stop the attacks before they occur, it is worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities (it was the case for the Paris and Brussels attacks, but also for the attacks in Orlando, where the terrorist had already been interviewed several times by the FBI).

Even more recently, the attacks were perpetrated by so called "lone wolfs", namely individuals that more or less suddenly decide on their own to commit terrorist attacks, without having previous links with a terrorist cell. This was for example the case of the attacks in Nice. According to witnesses, the terrorist got radicalized very quickly. These new kinds of terrorists raise new questions for enforcement authorities: they are difficult/impossible to detect and to prevent.

Finally, masive surveillance does not prevent terrorists from using encryption making it harder for massive surveillance to be really effective(which does not mean encryption should be regulated). Some argue that the above flaws in the security offered by massive surveillance are the proof that more surveillance should be carried out. Surveillance through data mining of online behaviors could show a correlation between certain behaviors and terrorists' behaviors, and therefore give a more or less reliable indication that a person is about to commit an attack.

In my opinion, this would imply that the entire population gives up most of its rights to privacy and of free speech, in exchange for a tool that I believe would be much less efficient than prevention campaigns, education and social policies aiming at inclusion and diversity.

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When he came at Columbia in October, the new General Counsel of the NSA mentioned that the NSA abide with the American laws. The above shows that the mass surveillance program was carried out in a legal framework that did not (and still does not) fully protects against overcollection of data. Even more: the technic used require bulk collection. As mentioned by the Guardian, "in order to find the needle in the haystack, they [the NSA] argue, they need access to the whole haystack" (1). If it is clear that there is a need for regulatory reform, another question that we should ask is the proportionality of this practice. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security. It is also worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities. Even more recently, the attacks were perpetrated by so called "lone wolfs", namely individuals that more or less suddenly decide on their own to commit terrorist attacks, without having previous links with a terrorist cell. This was for example the case of the attacks in Nice. According to witnesses, the terrorist got radicalized very quickly. These new kinds of terrorists raise new questions for enforcement authorities: they are difficult/impossible to detect and to prevent.
 
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In my opinion, this kind of program is not proportional because it implies that the entire population gives up most of its rights to privacy and of free speech for a method that will probably prove less efficient than we would expect. Also, we need to be aware that terrorism is probably not a temporary phenomenon.
 
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(1) The hyperlink does not seem to be working within the text: https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#p/13
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ClementLegrandSecondEssay 16 - 22 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW I Will finalize later today Privacy and Mass Surveillance of Terrorism through Big Data

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Privacy and Mass Surveillance of Terrorism through Big Data

 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

Introduction

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In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" (when using the word "terrorism" I refer to its American legal definition). I will then analyze the debate about anonymization of information as a method to protect privacy. Finally I will discuss the proportionnality of the massive surveillance.
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In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" (when using the word "terrorism" I refer to its American legal definition). I will then analyze the US legal framework and discuss the proportionnality of the massive surveillance.
 

Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". The three elements that are classically associated with Big data are the three "V"s, namely, Volume, Velocity and Variety. This means that Big Data involves the processing of an important amount of data (volume), that such data includes different kind of data (vareity) and that big data is characterized by the rapidity of the processing (velocity). Through using Big Data, it is possible to determine patterns of conducts and to make predictive deductions due to the correlation of these patterns. In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. The Snowden revelation showed that the NSA is collecting huge amount of data and that it monitors online communication through the collaboration with private companies. In the recent years, we have seen examples of how Big data has been used by intelligence services in suspected terrorism case. This use of Big Data is not limited to the American intelligence services.

Privacy and Surveillance: Anonymity and secrecy

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Tere are many definitions of "[Big Data". The three elements that are classically associated with Big data are the three "V"s, namely, Volume, Velocity and Variety. This means that Big Data involves the processing of an important amount of data (volume), that such data includes different kind of data (vareity) and that big data is characterized by the rapidity of the processing (velocity). Through using Big Data, it is possible to determine patterns of conducts and to make predictive deductions due to the correlation of these patterns. In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. The Snowden revelation showed that the NSA is collecting huge amount of data and that it monitors online communication through the collaboration with private companies. In the recent years, we have seen examples of how Big data has been used by intelligence services in suspected terrorism case. If this paper will focus on the collection of information by the NSA, it is worth noting that this use of Big Data is not limited to the American intelligence services.
 
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Analysis of the US legal framework

 
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In this situation, several These two events (the attacks and the lockdown of Brussels) illustrate two different kinds of security failures. In the first case, the security measures failed to prevent the attacks, in the other case, the preventive security measures did not lead to any suspect being arrested. These failures raise the question of the justification of the massive surveillance. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security. As in the example of the Belgians tweeting cats, this seems to be the main reason for which people accept it.
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Under the actual legal situation, there are very few situations in which the fourth amendement will apply to the situaiton described above. In the online world, the presence of intermediaries to provide the communication triggers the application of the third party doctrine,(resulting from the famouse case Smith V. Maryland), thereby excluding expectations of privacy on most of the online information. In my opinion, this doctrine should be modified to better fit the reality of today's society: just because and information is shared with an intermediary to transfer information to a third party does not mean that the communicants have no expectations of privacy with regard to this information.
 
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Even though there are counterexamples where the authorities succeeded to stop the attacks before they occur, it is worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities (it was the case for the Paris and Brussels attacks, but also for the attacks in Orlando, where the terrorist had already been interviewed several times by the FBI). In other words, the surveillance of these persons did not prevent them from perpetrating their attacks.
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Part of the collection of data under the PRISM program was subject to the section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance act. To summarize, this section of the act intends to facilitate the surveillance of non-US citizens reasonnably believed to be located outside of the United States. THis provision does not allow to "intentionally" target US persons or Non-US persons known to be located in the United States. This provision is the legal basis for the PRISM program. A FISA court decided that the NSA could use information relating to US persons that were "inadvertently" collected. In an interview conducted by John Oliver (and mixing journalism with comedy, in order to raise awareness of the public), Edward Snowden mentioned that, in practice, this meant that if information relating to US persons were temporarily stored as a back up in Europe, the information will be processed by the NSA. This raises questions. How can the law create a distinction based on categories of persons (i.e. more or less corresponding to US citizens) when the functioning of the internet is so international? I wonder to which extent it is technically possible to distinguish communication on the basis of their sender/reciever. THe protection of privacy requires ecological measures, because privacy is an environment that we all share. On this assumption it seems complicated to distinguish which kind of person has a right to breath a better air than another.
 
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Even more recently, the attacks were perpetrated by so called "lone wolfs", namely individuals that more or less suddenly decide on their own to commit terrorist attacks, without having previous links with a terrorist cell. This was for example the case of the attacks in Nice. According to witnesses, the terrorist got radicalized very quickly. These new kinds of terrorists raise new questions for enforcement authorities: they are difficult/impossible to detect and to prevent.
>
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The collection of domestic metadata relating to ponecalls were also conducted by the NSA pursuant to section 215 of the USA PAtriot Act. It is interesting to note that the data collected consisted in metadata. According to a long established idea, metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy thant content. However, as I have shown abouve, throught he use of Big Data it is posible to deduct a series of correlations, which can result in discovering the content. This idea that metadata is less intrusive upon one's privacy does not entirely correspond to today's technologies.
 
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Finally, masive surveillance does not prevent terrorists from using encryption making it harder for massive surveillance to be really effective(which does not mean encryption should be regulated).
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Mass surveillance : proportionality?

 
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The above shows that the regulatory framework of surveillance should stop or should be reformed. In my opinion the costs to human privacy are too high compared to the advantages. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security.Even though there are counterexamples where the authorities succeeded to stop the attacks before they occur, it is worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities (it was the case for the Paris and Brussels attacks, but also for the attacks in Orlando, where the terrorist had already been interviewed several times by the FBI).
 
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Mass surveillance : proportionality?

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Even more recently, the attacks were perpetrated by so called "lone wolfs", namely individuals that more or less suddenly decide on their own to commit terrorist attacks, without having previous links with a terrorist cell. This was for example the case of the attacks in Nice. According to witnesses, the terrorist got radicalized very quickly. These new kinds of terrorists raise new questions for enforcement authorities: they are difficult/impossible to detect and to prevent.

Finally, masive surveillance does not prevent terrorists from using encryption making it harder for massive surveillance to be really effective(which does not mean encryption should be regulated).

 Some argue that the above flaws in the security offered by massive surveillance are the proof that more surveillance should be carried out. Surveillance through data mining of online behaviors could show a correlation between certain behaviors and terrorists' behaviors, and therefore give a more or less reliable indication that a person is about to commit an attack.

In my opinion, this would imply that the entire population gives up most of its rights to privacy and of free speech, in exchange for a tool that I believe would be much less efficient than prevention campaigns, education and social policies aiming at inclusion and diversity.

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In the present draft, 60% of the space is taken up with your personal stories. It is not clear what the reader gets from this material that could not be presented in two brief paragraphs, leaving you time to present something more than a personal opinion as the conclusion of the second part. In this, state surveillance is treated as more widespread than commercial surveillance, which is almost certainly wrong, and of roughly equal competence, which is wrong too. That Brussels is the capital of a Europe that is now ceasing to exist, run by a sham national government that ceased to exist long ago, is never mentioned.

I think it would help to define the subject, which presumably is not Belgian incompetence and ridiculousness, nor the particular form of hysteria involved in living with potential "terrorists" one resolutely refuses to understand. If the subject is really "security" versus "privacy," and the goal is to take the opposition seriously, rather than as an act of simplistic political rhetoric, then the least we can do is to rise above the parochialism of one city's experience. It might be better to abandon the rhetoric of "tools" altogether, and to inquire what the social and communicative functions of this ritual actually are.

 

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ClementLegrandSecondEssay 15 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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ClementLegrandSecondEssay 14 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

Introduction

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In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" and Terrorism".
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In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" (when using the word "terrorism" I refer to its American legal definition). I will then analyze the debate about anonymization of information as a method to protect privacy. Finally I will discuss the proportionnality of the massive surveillance.
 

Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. It is
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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". The three elements that are classically associated with Big data are the three "V"s, namely, Volume, Velocity and Variety. This means that Big Data involves the processing of an important amount of data (volume), that such data includes different kind of data (vareity) and that big data is characterized by the rapidity of the processing (velocity). Through using Big Data, it is possible to determine patterns of conducts and to make predictive deductions due to the correlation of these patterns. In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. The Snowden revelation showed that the NSA is collecting huge amount of data and that it monitors online communication through the collaboration with private companies. In the recent years, we have seen examples of how Big data has been used by intelligence services in suspected terrorism case. This use of Big Data is not limited to the American intelligence services.
 

Privacy and Surveillance: Anonymity and secrecy


ClementLegrandSecondEssay 13 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"

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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW Privacy and Mass Surveillance of Terrorism through Big Data

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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW I Will finalize later today Privacy and Mass Surveillance of Terrorism through Big Data

 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

Introduction

In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" and Terrorism".

Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. In terms of terorrims, It is
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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. It is
 

Privacy and Surveillance: Anonymity and secrecy


ClementLegrandSecondEssay 12 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"
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 In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" and Terrorism".

Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". surveillance is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. In terms of terorrims, It is
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Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". In the recent years, surveillance through Big Data is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. In terms of terorrims, It is
 

Privacy and Surveillance: Anonymity and secrecy


ClementLegrandSecondEssay 11 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"

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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW Privacy and Mass Surveillance of Terrorism through Big Data

 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016
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Introduction

In this paper, I will analyze the different theories proposed to ensure the protection of privacy and the the use of big data surveillance. For this purpose, I will briefly set the scene by recalling the Snowden revelations and clarifying what is meant by "big data" and Terrorism".
 
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Massive surveillance = Security?

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Big Data Surveillance of "Terrorism"

Tere are many definitions of "[[Big Data]]". surveillance is very often associated to the prosecution and prevention of terrorrism. In terms of terorrims, It is

Privacy and Surveillance: Anonymity and secrecy

 
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These two events (the attacks and the lockdown of Brussels) illustrate two different kinds of security failures. In the first case, the security measures failed to prevent the attacks, in the other case, the preventive security measures did not lead to any suspect being arrested. These failures raise the question of the justification of the massive surveillance. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security. As in the example of the Belgians tweeting cats, this seems to be the main reason for which people accept it.
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In this situation, several These two events (the attacks and the lockdown of Brussels) illustrate two different kinds of security failures. In the first case, the security measures failed to prevent the attacks, in the other case, the preventive security measures did not lead to any suspect being arrested. These failures raise the question of the justification of the massive surveillance. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security. As in the example of the Belgians tweeting cats, this seems to be the main reason for which people accept it.
 Even though there are counterexamples where the authorities succeeded to stop the attacks before they occur, it is worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities (it was the case for the Paris and Brussels attacks, but also for the attacks in Orlando, where the terrorist had already been interviewed several times by the FBI). In other words, the surveillance of these persons did not prevent them from perpetrating their attacks.
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 Finally, masive surveillance does not prevent terrorists from using encryption making it harder for massive surveillance to be really effective(which does not mean encryption should be regulated).
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Conclusion

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Mass surveillance : proportionality?

 Some argue that the above flaws in the security offered by massive surveillance are the proof that more surveillance should be carried out. Surveillance through data mining of online behaviors could show a correlation between certain behaviors and terrorists' behaviors, and therefore give a more or less reliable indication that a person is about to commit an attack.

In my opinion, this would imply that the entire population gives up most of its rights to privacy and of free speech, in exchange for a tool that I believe would be much less efficient than prevention campaigns, education and social policies aiming at inclusion and diversity.


ClementLegrandSecondEssay 10 - 21 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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Under Review Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

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NOT FINAL UNDER REVIEW Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

ClementLegrandSecondEssay 9 - 19 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

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Under Review Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

ClementLegrandSecondEssay 8 - 14 Feb 2017 - Main.ClementLegrand
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 -- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016
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The Brussels attacks and the Brussels Lockdown: a personal perspective

I remember the morning of the 22 Mars 2016. I was going to the office with my wife, just like every morning. As we were stepping out of the elevator from our apartment in the south of Brussels, I received a notification from the BBC on my phone: “Explosions heard in Brussels Airport”. At this moment we did not realize what was happening, and we did not even consider not going to work. We were in our car, stocked in the usual traffic jam, somewhere in the 4 miles that separate our home from the office, and we were completely shocked about what we were hearing on the radio. Very quickly, while we were still in the car, we received the first videos of the ruins of the airport, still smoking and people fleeing and shouting. When we arrived at the office, located in the heart of Brussels, we learned that another explosion had just occurred at the subway station “Maelbeek”, a stone’s throw away from where we were. Everybody was terrified. We received dozens of messages from our friends and family, asking if we were still alive. Luckily yes, we were.

The following days, chaos took over Brussels. While we were still counting the number of victims, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), an agency composed of representatives from the State Security, the Intelligence Services and from the federal government, decided to increase the level of threat to the maximum level. Part of the public transportations where stopped, cultural events and places like cinemas, concert venues where closed. People were advised to stay at home. The investigators were still looking for the “man in the hat” who was filmed by the CCTV of the airport, accompanying the two suicide bombers. The city lived at the rhythm of the searches by the special unit of the federal police, assisted by heavily armed soldiers. To catch one of the few trains still riding, people had to go through strict security checks for which they had to wait during hours, thereby creating huge lines and enormous gathering of people.

Living in Brussels, I already encountered this situation. After the Paris Attack, the CUTA decided to lock down Brussels, to prevent an “imminent attack”. During 5 days, the capital of Europe was locked, everything was closed. Armored vehicles were placed around every potential target. I stumbled over a dozen of these military trucks just by walking back and forth the half mile from my office to the Palace of Justice (I had to submit trial briefs). The lock down was based upon information collected by the authorities, even if this information was (and is still today) unclear. In an interview given to the channel ABC News, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affair mentioned that the authorities were looking for 10 potential terrorists, heavily armed. In this interview, the Minister also confirmed that the collaboration with foreign intelligence services enabled the collection of very precise information about an imminent attack in Brussels. Despite the lack of information, the Belgians collaborated to the police operations. When the police asked the people to stop giving information about the police operations on Twitter, certain persons did not comply with this request. The Belgians decided to massively tweet pictures of cats. The idea was: “if you cannot prevent this information, you can make it hard to find, like finding a needle in a haystack”. By this action, it seems like Belgians were acknowledging the need for police operations, to protect their security. After 5 days, the authorities decided to stop the lockdown, even though they did not find the “10 potential terrorists, heavily armed” at this time.

 

Massive surveillance = Security?

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In the present draft, 60% of the space is taken up with your personal stories. It is not clear what the reader gets from this material that could not be presented in two brief paragraphs, leaving you time to present something more than a personal opinion as the conclusion of the second part. In this, state surveillance is treated as more widespread than commercial surveillance, which is almost certainly wrong, and of roughly equal competence, which is wrong too. That Brussels is the capital of a Europe that is now ceasing to exist, run by a sham national government that ceased to exist long ago, is never mentioned.

I think it would help to define the subject, which presumably is not Belgian incompetence and ridiculousness, nor the particular form of hysteria involved in living with potential "terrorists" one resolutely refuses to understand. If the subject is really "security" versus "privacy," and the goal is to take the opposition seriously, rather than as an act of simplistic political rhetoric, then the least we can do is to rise above the parochialism of one city's experience. It might be better to abandon the rhetoric of "tools" altogether, and to inquire what the social and communicative functions of this ritual actually are.

 

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Terrorism, Mass Surveillance and Security

-- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

The Brussels attacks and the Brussels Lockdown: a personal perspective

I remember the morning of the 22 Mars 2016. I was going to the office with my wife, just like every morning. As we were stepping out of the elevator from our apartment in the south of Brussels, I received a notification from the BBC on my phone: “Explosions heard in Brussels Airport”. At this moment we did not realize what was happening, and we did not even consider not going to work. We were in our car, stocked in the usual traffic jam, somewhere in the 4 miles that separate our home from the office, and we were completely shocked about what we were hearing on the radio. Very quickly, while we were still in the car, we received the first videos of the ruins of the airport, still smoking and people fleeing and shouting. When we arrived at the office, located in the heart of Brussels, we learned that another explosion had just occurred at the subway station “Maelbeek”, a stone’s throw away from where we were. Everybody was terrified. We received dozens of messages from our friends and family, asking if we were still alive. Luckily yes, we were.

The following days, chaos took over Brussels. While we were still counting the number of victims, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), an agency composed of representatives from the State Security, the Intelligence Services and from the federal government, decided to increase the level of threat to the maximum level. Part of the public transportations where stopped, cultural events and places like cinemas, concert venues where closed. People were advised to stay at home. The investigators were still looking for the “man in the hat” who was filmed by the CCTV of the airport, accompanying the two suicide bombers. The city lived at the rhythm of the searches by the special unit of the federal police, assisted by heavily armed soldiers. To catch one of the few trains still riding, people had to go through strict security checks for which they had to wait during hours, thereby creating huge lines and enormous gathering of people.

Living in Brussels, I already encountered this situation. After the Paris Attack, the CUTA decided to lock down Brussels, to prevent an “imminent attack”. During 5 days, the capital of Europe was locked, everything was closed. Armored vehicles were placed around every potential target. I stumbled over a dozen of these military trucks just by walking back and forth the half mile from my office to the Palace of Justice (I had to submit trial briefs). The lock down was based upon information collected by the authorities, even if this information was (and is still today) unclear. In an interview given to the channel ABC News, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affair mentioned that the authorities were looking for 10 potential terrorists, heavily armed. In this interview, the Minister also confirmed that the collaboration with foreign intelligence services enabled the collection of very precise information about an imminent attack in Brussels. Despite the lack of information, the Belgians collaborated to the police operations. When the police asked the people to stop giving information about the police operations on Twitter, certain persons did not comply with this request. The Belgians decided to massively tweet pictures of cats. The idea was: “if you cannot prevent this information, you can make it hard to find, like finding a needle in a haystack”. By this action, it seems like Belgians were acknowledging the need for police operations, to protect their security. After 5 days, the authorities decided to stop the lockdown, even though they did not find the “10 potential terrorists, heavily armed” at this time.

Massive surveillance = Security?

These two events (the attacks and the lockdown of Brussels) illustrate two different kinds of security failures. In the first case, the security measures failed to prevent the attacks, in the other case, the preventive security measures did not lead to any suspect being arrested. These failures raise the question of the justification of the massive surveillance. In most cases, massive surveillance is justified by the need for security. As in the example of the Belgians tweeting cats, this seems to be the main reason for which people accept it.

Even though there are counterexamples where the authorities succeeded to stop the attacks before they occur, it is worth noting that in some of the recent attacks, the perpetrators were already listed as potentially dangerous and were known by the authorities (it was the case for the Paris and Brussels attacks, but also for the attacks in Orlando, where the terrorist had already been interviewed several times by the FBI). In other words, the surveillance of these persons did not prevent them from perpetrating their attacks.

Even more recently, the attacks were perpetrated by so called "lone wolfs", namely individuals that more or less suddenly decide on their own to commit terrorist attacks, without having previous links with a terrorist cell. This was for example the case of the attacks in Nice. According to witnesses, the terrorist got radicalized very quickly. These new kinds of terrorists raise new questions for enforcement authorities: they are difficult/impossible to detect and to prevent.

Finally, masive surveillance does not prevent terrorists from using encryption making it harder for massive surveillance to be really effective(which does not mean encryption should be regulated).

Conclusion

Some argue that the above flaws in the security offered by massive surveillance are the proof that more surveillance should be carried out. Surveillance through data mining of online behaviors could show a correlation between certain behaviors and terrorists' behaviors, and therefore give a more or less reliable indication that a person is about to commit an attack.

In my opinion, this would imply that the entire population gives up most of its rights to privacy and of free speech, in exchange for a tool that I believe would be much less efficient than prevention campaigns, education and social policies aiming at inclusion and diversity.


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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

Mass Surveillance, Security and Terrorism

-- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

The perspective of a potential victim

I remember the morning of the 22 Mars 2016. I was going to the office with my wife, just like every morning. As we were stepping out of the elevator from our apartment in the south of Brussels, I received a notification from the BBC on my phone: “Explosions heard in Brussels Airport”. At this moment we did not realize what was happening, and we did not even consider not going to work. We were in our car, stocked in the usual traffic jam, somewhere in the 4 miles that separate our home from the office, and we were completely shocked about what we were hearing on the radio. Very quickly, while we were still in the car, we received the first videos of the ruins of the airport, still smoking and people fleeing and shouting. When we arrived at the office, located in the heart of Brussels, near the Royal Palace, we learned that another explosion had just occurred at the subway station “Maelbeek”, a stone’s throw away from where we were. Everybody was terrified. We received dozens of messages from our friends and family, asking if we were still alive. Luckily yes, we were. The following days, chaos took over Brussels. While we were still counting the number of victims, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), an agency composed of representatives from the State Security, the Intelligence Services and from the federal government, decided to increase the level of threat to the maximum level. Part of the public transportations where stopped, cultural events and places like cinemas, concert venues where closed. The people

Mass surveillance, Security and Freedom?

Subsection A

Subsection B


You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:

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The perspective of a potential victim

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I remember the morning of the 22 Mars 2016. I was going to the office with my wife, just like every morning. As we were stepping out of the elevator from our apartment in the south of Brussels, I received a notification from the BBC on my phone: “Explosions heard in Brussels Airport”. At this moment we did not realize what was happening, and we did not even consider not going to work. We were in our car, stocked in the usual traffic jam, somewhere in the 4 miles that separate our home from the office, and we were completely shocked about what we were hearing on the radio. Very quickly, while we were still in the car, we received the first videos of the ruins of the airport, still smoking and people fleeing and shouting. When we arrived at the office, located in the heart of Brussels, near the Royal Palace, we learned that another explosion had just occurred at the subway station “Maelbeek”, a stone’s throw away from where we were. Everybody was terrified. We received dozens of messages from our friends and family, asking if we were still alive. Luckily yes, we were. The following days, chaos took over Brussels. While we were still counting the number of victims, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), an agency composed of representatives from the State Security, the Intelligence Services and from the federal government, decided to increase the level of threat to the maximum level. Part of the public transportations where stopped, cultural events and places like cinemas, concert venues where closed. The people
 

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META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"

It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

Mass Surveillance, Security and Terrorism

-- By ClementLegrand - 09 Dec 2016

The perspective of a potential victim

Mass surveillance, Security and Freedom?

Subsection A

Subsection B


You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:

Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list.


Revision 17r17 - 22 Feb 2017 - 13:45:56 - ClementLegrand
Revision 16r16 - 22 Feb 2017 - 07:41:37 - ClementLegrand
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