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Justifying Lesser Sentences for Attempts in Criminal Law | |
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< | -- Revisions
Introduction
In the casebook commentary on attempt law, there was almost universal agreement that there is no principled justification for having lesser sentences for attempts as opposed to completed crimes. It wouldn’t hurt to explain attempt law in one sentence or so. Regardless of this academic consensus, however, all jurisdictions do, in fact, give lesser punishments for attempted crimes. Why? Is there any explanation? And why would most people intuitively think that the law has it right and the academics have it wrong? Do most people really think the law is right? I think you should back this up with more evidence or analysis. This essay will first explore first some reasons why legal systems have lesser sentences for attempt, and then explain why it is both ‘logically’ and realistically justified , both ‘logically’ and realistically. Do you believe that it is not logical? I assume that is why “logically” is in quotation marks. If you, I think you should state this in your introduction.
Section I: Why We Punish Less
You think that guy’s bad? Check this out: the effect of roles
As a famous playwright once wrote, “All the world's a stage, /And all the men and women merely players.” This rings especially true for criminal trials and the criminal justice system. As one way to justify (or at least prevent questioning) locking people up (or killing them), the state must sell ‘them” as ‘bad’ people to all of ‘us,’ the ‘good’ people. At the sentencing stage, the state can juxtapose certain ‘bad’ people against each other: these people deserve X number of years in prison, but look at what these people did- they deserve much more. The idea in this paragraph is not very clear. Who are the bad people and who are they being judged against? You use a lot of they and them and don’t explain who “they” are. Also, what makes someone bad? Is it the act itself?
A given punishment for the attempt makes it easy to rationalize a more severe punishment for the completed crime, thus achieving the state’s goal to punish by creating a hierarchy of roles. If punishments were bunched too closely at the high end, the roles would be less distinct or easily comparable, meaning less intuitive to people, who in turn might raise more questions. This structure occurs naturally when comparing attempted crimes and completed crimes: a given punishment for the attempt makes it easy to rationalize a more severe punishment for the completed crime, thus achieving the state’s goal to punish by creating a hierarchy of roles. The question then becomes why this hierarchical role creation is so appealing. Does gender and race play a role is this hierarchy?
Need for Hierarchy
In American society we are surrounded by hierarchies. Although there is dominance hierarchy found in many mammals, While It is unclear how much of this is innate (dominance hierarchy found in many mammals) or cultural considering the (nature of capitalism structure). The ordering of things is undoubtedly persuasive to the average American mind, and hierarchy is so pervasive that it psychologically feels natural. This tendency to look for order at least partially explains why the role-casting works- it creates a ‘natural’ order of crimes, with attempt logically falling below completion. These are all declaratory statements with not facts, studies, or statistics to back them up. Hierarchies could feel “psychologically” natural because it’s a learned behavior.
We thus create mental distances between one type of crime and another, so the ‘distance’ between the punishments of any two crimes becomes arguably as important as the harshness of any individual punishment. Given that death is (maybe) the worst punishment we currently allow, the punishment for attempted murder, for example, must be lower for the attempt to satisfy the mental distance and hierarchy expectations. These reasons at least partially explain why all jurisdictions probably punish attempts less severely despite academic disbelief, but there are also reasons why they should. Does intent matter at all? Considering that the intent in attempted first degree murder is the same as that in a completed first-degree murder. Should that matter?
Section II: Why We Should Punish Less
Rethinking Justification for Punishment- Real Risk Creation
The main justification in the current philosophy of punishment (or at least the Model Penal Code) is that we should punish the actor’s culpable mental state/intent. As such, most academics claim reduced punishment for attempt should not be based on the ‘luck’ of completing the crime or not. While it seems exceedingly unlikely that mental state is the only (or even the main) reason we punish, and the reason for failed attempts is probably not usually about luck (as discussed below), even if we concede that bad intentions are something worth punishing, is that really all? Is that really all what? What are you referring to?
In attempt law, wouldn’t the logical end of the desire to punish bad thoughts be ‘thought police’? Perhaps some might actually want 1984 -style Thought Police, but we would all eventually be behind bars. Alternatively, we could also focus on the risk the actor actually creates- how dangerous they can actually be in the world, not just in their head. Are ‘bad’ or half-hearted criminals equally as dangerous, and thus deserving of equal punishment? While some may disagree, it makes some sense to concern ourselves at least as much with what a criminal can do as what he can think. I’m confused at how attempt law punishes bad thoughts. I thought there had to be a substantial step or some kind of action taken before a person can be prosecuted for an attempt crime. Isn’t the attempt defined not only by the thoughts of the defendant but by his actions?
Psychology of Attempts
As mentioned, much of the philosophical argument is to avoid differentiating based on ‘luck.’
This assumes bad luck creates failed attempts, but maybe there are other reasons criminals fail. Perhaps in the back of their mind, the alleged criminal did not really want to do the crime, and hence stopped short of completion, or acted carelessly enough to get caught. Anyone can think of times when they didn’t really want to do something but did it anyways, giving only a half-hearted attempt which they knew would fail. I think this might be a weak argument. Do you have any evidence or commentators to support this point?
Given that so much crime is done by (or at least prosecuted against) desperate people in desperate situations, it seems reasonable that they often did not exert the requisite effort because they didn’t want to do it in first place (implicating psychological questions about action theory, etc). Again, what evidence do you have for this proposition that people prosecuted for attempts are 1) desperate and 2) often do not exert enough effort to get the job done? If we really are concerned with culpability and intent, and evidentiary proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is unclear why attempt should be blindly chalked up only to luck without exploring the real reasons why crimes fail.
The Real Nitty Gritty
The final reason for lesser punishments for attempt might be a bare rationalization, but regardless the basic idea is that the system is broken and any way to reduce punishments is worthwhile. Should we reduce punishments because the system doesn’t work or because attempts are lesser crimes or both? Under its current widespread application, the criminal justice systems gives disproportionate punishment to a disproportionate set of people, and does little to prevent them from recidivism. Given limited resources and the un-rehabilitating nature of prisons, it is not beneficial for society to put more people away for longer periods of time. If the baseline punishments are already ineffective (or at least unguided), it makes little sense to ratchet up sentences for what we cognitively consider less harsh crimes. The inherent danger is that given our hierarchical mental constructions, this will only lead to increasing the high-end to keep a comfortable distance from the low, a tendency already natural to the political process of being ‘tough on crime.’ Thus, attempt should be punished less for the reasons stated above and as a brute check on the severity of the criminal justice system itself. Shouldn’t society seek to deter the perpetration of attempts by punishing it severely enough that at least some people will think twice before trying it? Your solution seems to take the stance that since the system is broken, we should throw up our hands and give minimal punishments.
Final comment: I think you have a good paper. There were just some ideas that weren’t clear or statements that seemed declaratory without any evidence. I also wasn’t sure why you used so many quotes and brackets. I think it is a little excessive, and became gimmicky the further I got into your paper. I think that some of the phrases can be taken out of the brackets and added directed to your sentences.
-- RorySkaggs - 13 Apr 2010 | | | Introduction | |
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< | In the casebook commentary on attempt law, there was almost universal agreement that there is no principled justification for having lesser sentences for attempts as opposed to completed crimes. Regardless of this academic consensus, however, all jurisdictions do, in fact, give lesser punishments for attempted crimes. Why? Is there any explanation? And why would most people intuitively think that the law has it right and the academics have it wrong? This essay will explore first some reasons why legal systems have lesser sentences for attempt, and then explain why it is justified, both ‘logically’ and realistically.
Section I: Why We Punish Less
You think that guy’s bad? Check this out: the effect of roles
As a famous playwright once wrote, “All the world's a stage, /And all the men and women merely players.” This rings especially true for criminal trials and the criminal justice system. As one way to justify (or at least prevent questioning) locking people up (or killing them), the state must sell ‘them” as ‘bad’ people to all of ‘us,’ the ‘good’ people. At the sentencing stage, the state can juxtapose certain ‘bad’ people against each other: these people deserve X number of years in prison, but look at what these people did- they deserve much more. | >
> | In the casebook commentary on criminal attempt, there was near universal agreement that attempts should be punished equally to completed crimes. Regardless of this academic consensus, most jurisdictions generally give lesser punishments for attempts (with some exceptions). Why? Is there any explanation? And why would most people (or at least lawmakers, apparently) intuitively think that the law has it right and the academics have it wrong? This essay will first explore reasons why legal systems might have lesser sentences for attempt, then explain why it is justified, and finally discuss why these inquiries are important. | | | | |
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< | If punishments were bunched too closely at the high end, the roles would be less distinct or easily comparable, meaning less intuitive to people, who in turn might raise more questions. This structure occurs naturally when comparing attempted crimes and completed crimes: a given punishment for the attempt makes it easy to rationalize a more severe punishment for the completed crime, thus achieving the state’s goal to punish by creating a hierarchy of roles. The question then becomes why this hierarchical role creation is so appealing. | >
> | Why We Punish Less | | | | |
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< | Need for Hierarchy | >
> | Role-Casting | | | | |
<
< | In American society we are surrounded by hierarchies. While it is unclear how much of this is innate (dominance hierarchy found in many mammals) or cultural (nature of capitalism structure), the ordering of things is undoubtedly persuasive to the average American mind, and hierarchy is so pervasive that it psychologically feels natural. This tendency to look for order at least partially explains why the role-casting works- it creates a ‘natural’ order of crimes, with attempt logically falling below completion. | >
> | As one way to justify locking people up, the state casts criminals as ‘bad,’ which unifies the rest of us as ‘good’. At the sentencing stage, the state can then juxtapose ‘bad’ people against each other: if this bad guy deserves five years in jail just for trying to do something, and this bad guy actually did it, then he must deserve at least ten years, etc. | | | | |
<
< | We thus create mental distances between one type of crime and another, so the ‘distance’ between the punishments of any two crimes becomes arguably as important as the harshness of any individual punishment. Given that death is (maybe) the worst punishment we currently allow, the punishment for attempted murder, for example, must be lower for the attempt to satisfy the mental distance and hierarchy expectations. These reasons at least partially explain why all jurisdictions probably punish attempts less severely despite academic disbelief, but there are also reasons why they should. | >
> | A given punishment for attempt makes it easy to rationalize a more severe punishment for the completed crime, justifying all punishment by creating a hierarchy of roles. If punishments were bunched too closely at the high end, the roles would be less distinct or easily comparable, meaning less intuitive to people, who in turn might raise more questions. But why is this hierarchical role creation is so appealing? | | | | |
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< | Section II: Why We Should Punish Less | >
> | Hierarchical Expectations | | | | |
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< | Rethinking Justification for Punishment- Real Risk Creation | >
> | Nearly every society around the world is ruled by hierarchies. It is unclear how much of our hierarchical structures are due to instinct or learned historically or culturally- e.g., the nature of capitalism in America. Without touching the debate over assigning values in power hierarchies, the ordering of things generally is so pervasive that it probably feels natural and self-evident. This tendency to look for order at least partially explains why the role-casting works- it creates a ‘natural’ order of crimes, with attempt logically falling below completion. | | | | |
<
< | The main justification in the current philosophy of punishment (or at least the Model Penal Code) is that we should punish the actor’s culpable mental state/intent. As such, most academics claim reduced punishment for attempt should not be based on the ‘luck’ of completing the crime or not. While it seems exceedingly unlikely that mental state is the only (or even the main) reason we punish, and the reason for failed attempts is probably not usually about luck (as discussed below), even if we concede that bad intentions are something worth punishing, is that really all? | >
> | We thus create mental distances between different crimes, so the ‘distance’ between the punishments of any two crimes becomes arguably as important as the harshness of any individual punishment. Given that death is (maybe) the worst punishment we currently allow, the punishment for attempted murder, for example, must be lower for the attempt to satisfy the mental distance and hierarchy expectations. These reasons at least partially explain why jurisdictions probably punish attempts less severely despite academic disbelief, but there are also reasons why they should. | | | | |
<
< | In attempt law, wouldn’t the logical end of the desire to punish bad thoughts be ‘thought police’? Perhaps some might actually want 1984 -style Thought Police, but we would all eventually be behind bars. Alternatively, we could also focus on the risk the actor actually creates- how dangerous they can actually be in the world, not just in their head. Are ‘bad’ or half-hearted criminals equally as dangerous, and thus deserving of equal punishment? While some may disagree, it makes some sense to concern ourselves at least as much with what a criminal can do as what he can think. | >
> | Why We Should Punish Less | | | | |
<
< | Psychology of Attempts | >
> | Real Risk Creation | | | | |
<
< | As mentioned, much of the philosophical argument is to avoid differentiating based on ‘luck.’
This assumes bad luck creates failed attempts, but maybe there are other reasons criminals fail. Perhaps in the back of their mind, the alleged criminal did not really want to do the crime, and hence stopped short of completion, or acted carelessly enough to get caught. Anyone can think of times when they didn’t really want to do something but did it anyways, giving only a half-hearted attempt which they knew would fail. | >
> | The main casebook justification in the philosophy of punishment (and the MPC) is that we should punish the actor’s culpable mental state/intent. As such, many academics claim reduced punishment for attempt should not be based on the ‘luck’ of completing the crime or not. Even if we concede that bad intentions are something worth punishing, is that really the only basis for punishment we should use? | | | | |
<
< | Given that so much crime is done by (or at least prosecuted against) desperate people in desperate situations, it seems reasonable that they often did not exert the requisite effort because they didn’t want to do it in first place (implicating psychological questions about action theory, etc). If we really are concerned with culpability and intent, and evidentiary proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is unclear why attempt should be blindly chalked up only to luck without exploring the real reasons why crimes fail. | >
> | In attempt law, the logical end of the desire to punish bad thoughts would be 1984 -style Thought Police, meaning we would all eventually be behind bars. And while the MPC and many jurisdictions require a substantial step before punishing an attempt, the step is only an evidentiary tool to confirm intent, and the actions themselves are not what is being punished- otherwise the substantial step would be a complete crime itself. Alternatively, another justification could be focusing on the risk the actor actually creates- how dangerous they can actually be in the world, not just in their head. Are ineffective or half-hearted criminals equally as dangerous, and thus deserving of equal punishment? While some may disagree, and in practice it might make no difference, it makes some sense to concern ourselves in criminal theory at least as much with what a criminal can do as what he can think. | | | | |
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< | The Real Nitty Gritty | >
> | Reevaluating the System | | | | |
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< | The final reason for lesser punishments for attempt might be a bare rationalization, but regardless the basic idea is that the system is broken and any way to reduce punishments is worthwhile. Under its current widespread application, the criminal justice systems gives disproportionate punishment to a disproportionate set of people, and does little to prevent them from recidivism. Given limited resources and the un-rehabilitating nature of prisons, it is not beneficial for society to put more people away for longer periods of time. If the baseline punishments are already ineffective (or at least unguided), it makes little sense to ratchet up sentences for what we cognitively consider less harsh crimes. The inherent danger is that given our hierarchical mental constructions, this will only lead to increasing the high-end to keep a comfortable distance from the low, a tendency already natural to the political process of being ‘tough on crime.’ Thus, attempt should be punished less for the reasons stated above and as a brute check on the severity of the criminal justice system itself. | >
> | Another reason for lesser punishments for attempt (aside from attempts maybe just being lesser crimes) is that punishment is already generally too harsh and ineffective for all crimes, so any reduction is beneficial. The criminal justice system often gives disproportionate punishment to a disproportionate set of people, and does little to prevent recidivism. Given limited resources, it is not advantageous for society to put more people away for longer periods of time until we have some evidence that it is actually doing something positive. | | | | |
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Re: Why we punish less
There is always the mainstay retributive theory of justice, the "eye for an eye" principle. We punish completed crimes more than inchoate crimes because the actual societal harm suffered from the former is greater than the latter.
-- MatthewZorn - 19 Apr 2010 | >
> | There is obvious debate on the deterrent effect of jail time. But if one accepts the premise that locking people up for extended periods of time only makes them more angry, dangerous and less able to reintegrate into society when they get out given the lack of focus on rehabilitation, or even that until we know if incapacitation works we should err in favor of those being punished and not just hang them out to dry, then increasing punishment for attempt can only make things worse. The inherent danger of doing so is that given our hierarchical mental expectations, this would only lead to further increasing punishments for completed crimes to keep a comfortable distance from attempts, a ratcheting-up tendency already natural to the political process of being ‘tough on crime.’ | | | | |
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< | Matt- good point. This is probably part of the 'real risk creation' thing, but only in the background. I think I focused so much on meeting the academic viewpoint on its own terms that I left out entirely different justifications that would explain things. Something for me (or whoever is revising this) to keep in mind during editing, although I'm not sure how an eye for an eye would work smoothly with attempts, given that arguably no harm has been created so maybe there would be no reason to punish at all (not a very realistic option). | >
> | Why it Matters | | | | |
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< | -- RorySkaggs - 21 Apr 2010 | >
> | As mentioned, much of the casebook argument is to avoid differentiating punishment based on ‘luck.’ This assumes bad luck creates failed attempts, but maybe there are other reasons criminals fail. Perhaps the alleged criminal did not really want to do the crime, and hence stopped short of completion, or acted carelessly enough to get caught. Anyone can think of times when they didn’t really want to do something but did it anyways, giving only a half-hearted attempt which they knew would fail. | | | | |
>
> | These kinds of inquiries are not unique to attempt law. For example, instead of writing off Joe Stack as crazy, maybe we should look at why he did what he did so we can prevent it next time. Likewise, instead of assuming those who attempt are as bad as those who complete, perhaps we should do some research to learn why they failed, as it might shed some light on what punishment is actually appropriate for their ‘crime.’ | | | | |
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< | On the other hand, my focus was not on why to punish at all, but only why to have reduced sentences, so maybe the retribution theory is not as helpful here as it might be elsewhere.
-- RorySkaggs - 22 Apr 2010
As I've thought about my paper, I've realized that while it may or may not be an interesting intellectual debate, I don't really propose anything that would change the real world (because as I point out, attempts are punished less despite the MPC, etc). I was thinking on revision I might put in a proposal that attempts at 'low' crimes be punished only by fines or community service, and maybe even make them civil penalties (does this mean the burden can switch to preponderance of the evidence- giving a trade-off to prosecutors? I have to look into it, I don't know how civil penalties work). | >
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< | -- RorySkaggs - 02 May 2010 | | |
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