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UdiKarklinskyFirstPaper 7 - 29 Apr 2015 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Law and Economics Applications to Privacy Law | | | This leads to the conclusion that perhaps, in order for things to get better, they first have to get worse. As the situation will deteriorate, potentially more and more people will be exposed to stories about those harmed, and only such “availability” could eliminate these tendencies. If the government took your neighbor, you will know that it might also eventually come for you. Is it possible to fix these misperceptions in less painful ways? In the context of crime deterrence, it has been argued that in order to eliminate criminals’ perception of “I’ll never get caught” the police should make arrests as “loud” as possible, to reach other criminals’ attention and impact their perception of the arrest probability. Applying this logic here provides an additional justification to the need for activists to effectively communicate the risks to as many consumers as possible. | |
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So the result of the application of all this rhetoric to the situation is to confirm our view that people should be better informed and the people who are better informed should work as hard as possible to inform others.
| | | Contract Design | | | It is also important that consumers will understand that the freedoms that they give up have value (even monetary!). Researchers have identified an endowment effect: people tend to ascribe more value to what they own (Knetsch 1989, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifferences Curves). Such an effect means that if consumers will have better understanding of the freedoms they lose and their worth, and develop a sense of ownership over them, Google will have much harder time taking them. With that regard, perhaps even the information on how much am I, as a consumer, is worth to Google, could affect my decision. | |
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Here the outcome is that if people knew their value they wouldn't sell too low. But presumably we should not run an active slave market so that people would know what their bodies were worth, and wouldn't accept low wages. Or should we?
| | | Conclusion
The application of (mainly behavioral) L&E into privacy law could improve the understanding of why consumers disregard the harms of their choices; and raise interesting ideas about how to promote change. Obviously, this paper has only touched upon several applications, and there is much room for further thinking. | |
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I'm not sure what "applications" we got here. I think what was demonstrated instead is that a vocabulary could be applied. We now know that it is possible to use some pre-existing system of description to describe also this stuff. There is absolutely no intellectual or social payoff yet for doing so, so far as the essay extends. We haven't learned anything new, or been presented with a new idea, yet.
I think the way to improve this draft is by having an actual good idea to offer the reader up front. You could then show the reader how you got this good idea through behavioral economics, if that's in fact how you did it, which would be an advertisement for behavioral economics, if your purpose is to advertise it. Those of us who are more interested in the idea itself than we are in how you came by it could pay attention to that too, of course.
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